Gender, Leadership and Choice in Multiparty Systems

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ABSTRACT: While a significant amount of research seeks to explain the comparative number of women in national legislatures, there is little research that examines the effects of women’s leadership of political parties on voting behaviour. This article brings together research on leadership effects in parliamentary elections and female candidate effects in legislative races. Ideological, structural, and situational differences between men and women have been used to explain gender gaps in voting. We explore an alternative explanation – gender identity. When women candidates are present, the gender identity hypothesis assumes that women voters are more likely to choose women candidates because of gender. While this hypothesis has been tested in legislative races, it has not been applied to party leaders in parliamentary elections. We test the gender identity hypothesis in Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Britain. We find that leadership evaluations affect vote choice across all countries but the effects of gender and the combined effects of gender and leadership differ across countries.

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Introduction

As more women run for political office, the gender of the candidate has become an increasingly important characteristic in the study of elections. In some countries women are more likely than men to express a willingness to vote for a female candidate (Burrell 1996; Welch and Studlar 1988). Some early research found that women candidates are more likely to be at a disadvantage than men (Kelley and McAllister 1983). More recent research shows that this disadvantage may be diminishing (Studlar and Matland 1996). The effect of candidate gender, however, has been applied primarily to local and district level races rather than in the context of a national campaign. Additionally, although much attention has been paid to the comparative number of women in national legislatures (for example, see Darcy, Welch and Clark 1994; Rule 1987 and 1994), little attention has been paid to women’s leadership of political parties even though political parties are the main recruiting organisations for legislative candidates. In this article we examine the effect of women party leaders in parliamentary elections on leadership evaluations and voting behavior.

Gender and Voting Behavior

Much of the early literature on gender and electoral behavior noted that when men and women differed in political preferences, women tended to be located more to the right along the political spectrum than men (Duverger 1955, Almond and Verba 1963, Inglehart 1977). In a summary of this early research, Randall (1982) finds that in every country studied women were more likely to vote for conservative parties. This gap has been attributed to such factors as differing socialization patterns and women’s lack of experience in the paid workforce. According to Baxter and Lansing (1983) the conservative gender gap, at least in Britain, can be explained by differences in age and religion. In a more recent study, once religion is held constant, this
conservative gender gap disappears in most European countries except Italy (Norris 1988). As women’s participation in the paid labor force increases and religious ties wane we would expect the gender gap pattern to also change. In fact, since the 1980s in most Western democracies the gender gap has reflected the tendency for women to be more left wing on issues than men (de Vaus and McAllister 1989, see also Jelen, Thomas and Wilcox 1994).

Most general explanations of the left leaning gender gap in voting rest on issue or ideological differences between men and women; the difference in issue positions are attributed to either the disproportionate effect on women of an adverse economy, mobilisation due to the women's movement, women's roles as primary caregivers or women's rejection of the traditional power structure (Carroll and Zerilli 1992). However, in a recent study focusing specifically on voting behavior, Studlar, McAllister and Hayes (1998) conclude that the direction of the bivariate gender gap and the explanations for this gap vary by country. For example, while occupational patterns and familial commitments help explain the gender gaps in Australia and Britain, the leftist political orientations of women help to explain the gender gap in the United States.

In the United States, where a left leaning gender gap has been evident since the 1980s, these ideological differences have been applied to studies of candidate gender. Women candidates are perceived to be more compassionate on social issues and more liberal than men (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993). This gender stereotyping also underlies the role of candidate gender as a cost-cutting decision heuristic; when compared to their male counterparts within the same party, women candidates perform better among voters on the left and worse among voters on the right (McDermott 1997). Consequently, gender stereotyping of female candidates when combined with a tendency for women to be to the left of men ideologically may account for
gender differences in support for female candidates. In parliamentary democracies, where the leader of a party on the left is a woman, the party may gain further credibility to the party as representing women’s concerns.

An alternative to the sociological and ideological explanations for the gender gap in voting rests on the notion of identity politics which is based on the idea that a voter makes an electoral choice on the basis of social group membership (Pomper 1975). As a result, women will express gender identity by supporting female candidates even if that means crossing party lines (Cook 1994; Plutzer and Zipp 1996). According to this explanation, women who support female candidates are not strictly expressing issues preferences but are showing solidarity. When parties in parliamentary democracies are headed by women, gender identity may increase support for the party among women voters. Unlike the first explanation which relies on issue differences and stereotypes of female candidates, the group identity theory does not propose a bias in the gender gap that favours candidates on the left.

The gender identity hypothesis is supported by research based on the 1992 elections in the U.S., when a record number of women contested seats. Cook (1994) finds some evidence that women voters defect from partisan attachments to support somebody of like sex. While Plutzer and Zipp (1996) also find evidence for partisan defection, they find that the group identity effect is amplified for Democratic female candidates. These studies suggest that some women may cross party lines to vote for female candidates when their party’s candidate is male though it is unclear whether male voters will desert their party’s candidate when that candidate is a women. That female candidates will attract votes from women but may lose votes from men is largely consistent with research indicating that women are not disadvantaged (Darcy, Welch and Clark 1994, Welch and Studlar 1988; Norris, Vallance and Lovenduski 1994; for an exception, see
Kelley and McAllister 1983). In one of the few pieces of research on party leader gender and voter support, O’Neill (1998) finds that both women leaders in the 1993 Canadian federal elections were able to recruit women voters to their respective parties.

Women’s status as outsiders is recognized as an advantage when voters are increasingly disenchanted with current elected officials. This gender advantage may be stimulated by the context of the election, when the gender of the candidates becomes a news story in itself such as in the 1992 United States elections. Sapiro and Conover (1997) find that gender differences emerge in presidential vote choice when women are running for lower office in the voter’s state. This effect may be apparent in parliamentary elections when women party leaders are the focus of the party’s campaign or when women’s issues are on the agenda. O’Neill (1998) suggests that the focus on women leaders played a role in attracting women voters to the parties headed by women in the 1993 Canadian election.

The group identity hypothesis has only been tested in electorate contests where female candidates were present. That the gender of the candidate serves as a cue for voters has never been examined in the context of national campaigns where the leader of the party is a woman. In parliamentary systems, the leaders of the parties are more visible than local candidates and, therefore, a group identity explanation of a gender gap is relevant. We would expect that the group identity explanations of the gender gap would also apply to leadership evaluations and that women would be more likely to view women leaders and leaders on the left more favourably. In the next section, we address the role of leadership evaluations in parliamentary elections.
Leadership Evaluations in Parliamentary Elections

The electoral effects of leadership evaluations have been featured in U.S. presidential elections since the earliest behavioural studies (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1944; Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954, Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 1960). A voter’s image of the candidate has an impact on vote choice separate from the influences of issues and partisan attachments. In a comparative context, the focus on candidate qualities in systems where presidents are popularly elected makes sense as a candidate becomes the standard bearer for the party and will be the most visible representative of his or her party. While there is an extensive body of research on the effect of candidate evaluations on vote choice in the U.S (for a review of the literature see Wattenberg 1991), the influence of party leaders in parliamentary systems is less clear though the body of research is growing (for a review see Hayes and McAllister 1997).

Because presidents are directly elected and prime ministers are selected by the legislature and are generally leaders of the largest party forming a government, we might expect candidate effects in presidential systems and that responsible party theory would prevail in parliamentary systems. Nevertheless, many have noted the increasing importance of candidate effects in parliamentary systems (Glaser and Salmon 1991, McAllister 1992, Mughan 1993). The increasing focus on party leaders in parliamentary systems can be seen as the result of at least two trends: the decline of partisan identification (Katz and Mair 1994) and the changing role of the electronic media (Mughan 1995). It is much easier for the media to focus on a handful of leaders as the symbols of the parties (McAllister 1996, 287) and there is some evidence that leaders are gaining more media coverage than issues (Butler and Ranney 1992). Weak attachments to political parties places more demand on leaders who are able to mobilise voters.
The growing body of research on leadership effects in parliamentary systems summarised by McAllister (1996) suggests that party leaders have some influence on electoral outcomes. For example, previous analysis of New Zealand elections has examined the relative influence of leadership, local candidates and partisanship (Bean 1992; Vowles, Aimer, Catt, Lamare and Miller 1995). Since the 1960s there has been a noticeable decline in the influence of partisanship on voting and an increase in the influence of party leaders and local candidates (Bean 1992, 149).

Hayes and McAllister (1997) present evidence that shows gender has an effect on vote choice both directly and indirectly through candidate evaluations. In an analysis of the 1993 Australian election and the 1992 elections in the United States and Britain, they find that the interaction of gender and leadership evaluations had an effect in Australia and the United States but not in Britain. After controlling for a range of political and socio-demographic characteristics, they show that leadership evaluations of Keating, the Australian Labor Party leader, had less of an impact on vote choice for women than for men while, in the United States, evaluations of Clinton had more of an impact for women (Hayes and McAllister 1997, 19). However, in the Hayes and McAllister (1997) analysis, the gender of the leaders is always male. The question remains as to what extent the gender of the party leader influences leadership evaluations and voting behavior.

In sum, the research on leadership evaluations in parliamentary countries leads us to expect that party leaders influence vote choice. Additional research on issues, gender stereotypes, female candidates and vote choice lead us to expect gender differences in supporting parties headed by women. The second line of research on gender identity suggests that we should expect gender effects for female party leaders regardless of ideological leanings and these effects may be greater when gender is given as a cue in the context of the campaign either through a
focus on the gender of the candidates or gender issues. Furthermore, those women who give favourable ratings to female candidates may be even more likely to vote for a party headed by a woman.

**Women Leaders in New Zealand, Canada, Australia and Britain**

Despite the overall paucity of women party leaders, in recent elections held between 1993 and 1996 four parties in Canada, Australia and New Zealand were headed by women. In New Zealand, following its defeat in the 1993 election, the Labour party selected Helen Clark, an intellectual leaning to the left on social and economic issues, as party leader. The Australian Democrats have been lead by women since 1986 when Janine Haines became the first woman in Australia’s history to lead a political party. Cheryl Kernot was elected leader of the federal party after the 1993 election and led the party into the 1996 election. In 1993, two Canadian parties were headed by women. Audrey McLaughlin was elected head of the National Democratic Party in 1989 and Kim Campbell replaced Brian Mulroney as head of the Progressive Conservatives in June of 1993. Prior to the 1990s, the most visible woman party leader was Margaret Thatcher who stood as the party leader in three British elections.

Because a number of women rose to prominence as leaders of major parties in Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, elections in these parliamentary democracies serve as useful cases for examining the question of how the gender of party leaders influences leadership evaluations and, in turn, how these evaluations influence voting behaviour. The gender identity hypothesis leads us to expect that, regardless of ideological placement of the party, women will rate women leaders more favourably than men. Additionally, once the effects of sociological,
economic and political factors are held constant, we should still find that women are more likely to support parties headed by women.\textsuperscript{2} 

Given that our sample of four countries includes just parliamentary systems, we do not expect great differences between countries in the effect of leadership evaluations. However, differences between electoral systems leads us to expect some differences. In particular, New Zealand’s use of a party vote to determine overall partisan representation in parliament may lead to greater leadership effects. In New Zealand's new mixed electoral system, party leader effects weigh more heavily on the party vote and candidate evaluations weigh more heavily on the electorate vote (Vowles, Aimer, Banducci and Karp 1998, 252). In systems where candidates run in single member districts attention may be diverted from the party leader while voters focus on the candidates in their electorate. Evidence from Britain suggests that MPs are able to cultivate a personal vote that is separate from the fortunes of the party (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987). Where party lists are used, more focus may be given to the national parties and their leaders. Consequently, we expect the gender of the leader will also have a greater impact in New Zealand on the party vote than in single member district contests in Australia, Canada or Britain.

The context of the election may also have an effect on the interaction between gender and leadership evaluations. Both Helen Clark and Kim Campbell were at the center of their respective party’s campaigns and both represented major parties. The prominence of these leaders in their respective party’s election campaigns is likely to strengthen gender identity. On the other hand, women’s issues were not prominent in the 1996 Australian elections when both major parties distanced themselves from women’s and minority issues. This left the door open for Cheryl Kernot and the Australian Democrats to focus on issues of gender equity (Sawer 1997). The focus on women as leaders rather than on women’s issues per se may influence the
relationship between leadership evaluations and gender. With Campbell’s leadership of the Progressive Conservatives and Thatcher’s leadership of the Conservative Party in Britain, we are also able to test whether the gender effects apply only to candidates and parties on the left.

The Gender Gap in New Zealand, Canada, Australia and Britain

The voting gender gap has a different history in each of the countries under study. Australia and Britain have right leaning gender gaps with women being more likely to support candidates and parties on the right. While in the past women in Canada and New Zealand tended to be more conservative, women in these countries now follow the more recent trend of women leaning more toward candidates and parties on the left. Because some gender gap explanations are based on ideological differences between parties, a graphical display of party placements along a left-right continuum is given in Appendix A.

Survey data from the 1961 election in New Zealand show an advantage for the National Party, a right party, among women when appropriate control variables are added; however, the advantage disappears in the 1981 and 1990 elections (Vowles 1993). In 1993, a gender gap appeared again; however, this time more women were supporting the Labour party on the left. Following Labour’s defeat in 1993, the Labour party selected Helen Clark to lead the party and Labour strategists put Clark at the center of their 1996 campaign (Levine and Roberts 1997). Although early campaign polls suggested lacklustre support for Clark, her performance in the two debates (in which she was identified as “the winner”) helped Labour immensely, bringing the party to within reach of National (Johnston 1998).

In Canada, a gender gap in partisanship emerged as early as 1979 with women being more likely to identify with the National Democratic Party (NDP), a left party, and the Liberal
Party, a center party usually characterized as a brokerage party. The NDP had been appealing to women voters since the 1970s. However, it was not until the 1984 election, that a gender gap emerged in voting choice (Brodie 1991). In 1988, the Liberal party enjoyed a 7 percent advantage among women while the NDP enjoyed an advantage of 3 percent. On the right, men favored the Progressive Conservatives by 8 percent (Clarke, Jenson, LeDuc and Pammett 1996).

In February of 1993, when Kim Campbell replaced the unpopular Brian Mulroney as leader of the Progressive Conservatives it was hoped a female leader with a “new style of politics” would restore the image of the party (Clarke, Jenson, LeDuc and Pammett 1996). Campbell distanced herself from Mulroney and the Conservative campaign focused exclusively on her as leader at the expense of issues. Whereas, Helen Clark in New Zealand was able to renew Labour’s standing in the polls based on the strength of her performance in a party leader’s debate, Campbell was not able to achieve a more positive image for herself or her party (Clarke, Jenson, LeDuc and Pammett 1996). Possibly due to the unpopularity of all party leaders (Chretien was the only one to achieve a ranking above neutral), leadership evaluations played less of a role in the 1993 election than in 1988 (Clarke, Jenson, LeDuc and Pammett 1996).

Unlike Canada and New Zealand, women in Australia are more likely to support the Liberal-National coalition on the right (Renfrow 1994; McAllister 1992; Aitken 1977). Leithner (1997) attributes this gap to Australia’s sex-segregated workplace. Women are more likely to work in smaller firms and consequently less likely to encounter the union’s pro-Labor message. The result is that male union members are more likely to support the Australian Labor Party (ALP) than women union members. Yet, the Liberal advantage among women voters does not translate into an advantage for Liberal women candidates. Looking at elections from the 1970s, Kelley and McAllister find that women candidates on average suffer a 3 percent loss. However,
these losses vary significantly from one party to another with Liberal women having the greatest
disadvantage compared to women candidates from the ALP and from smaller parties (1983,
373). Still other smaller parties have been able to make inroads with female voters. Sawer
attributes the success of the Australian Democrats in doubling their share of the vote between the
1993 and 1996 elections to the leadership of Cheryl Kernot, who was elected leader after the
1993 election, and a policy agenda that focused on equity issues and provided a needed contrast
to the “gender blind economism of the major parties” (1997, 78).

The gender gap in Britain, when present, has generally been a right leaning gender gap
with women more likely to support the Conservative candidate (Norris 1988). However, as in
most countries, the existence and size of the gender gap is dependent on the election. Norris and
Lovenduski (1993) present data on the voting gender gap in Britain since 1945. Conservatives
have always tended to attract a greater proportion of women voters which some attribute to the
Conservative focus on church and family. The gender gap reached a peak in the early 1950s with
an average gap of eight percent in support for Conservatives (Norris 1988). However, according
to Studlar, McAllister and Hayes (1998), the elections of 1979, 1983 and 1987 produced left
leaning gender gaps and this change of support was under Britain’s first woman prime minister
(see also Crewe 1983).

As can be seen in Table 1, significant gender gaps in voting exist in recent elections in
all countries except Britain. In Canada’s 1993 election and New Zealand’s 1996 election,
women are more likely to vote for parties on the left than men. This left leaning gender gap is
most evident in New Zealand where the Labour Party enjoyed an advantage of almost 10
percent, the widest gap observed in New Zealand elections (Vowles 1998, 33). However, the
gender gap is not evident in support for the Alliance, a party to the left of Labour, suggesting that
Helen Clark may have attracted a disproportionate share of women on the left. In Canada, the Liberal Party enjoyed an advantage of 4 percent while the NDP enjoyed an advantage among women of only 1.5 per cent. However, the PC also had an advantage among women in 1993. The male advantage for the PC in 1988 appears to have shifted to the far right where the Reform Party received a disproportionate share of the vote from men. Of male votes, 23 percent chose Reform while only 15 percent of women did. This trend is also apparent in New Zealand, where ACT, a far right party, enjoys a similar advantage among men.

In Australia, the major center-left party, the Australian Labor Party, continued to experience a disadvantage among women; there was a 5 per cent disadvantage among women voters. The right Liberal-National Coalition had a slight advantage among women; however, this slight advantage is overshadowed by the advantage that the two smaller center and left parties, the Australian Democrats and the Greens, enjoyed among women. Therefore, the gender gap in Australia appears to be due to an anti-Labor party sentiment among women. As the bivariate analysis in Table 1 shows, no significant gender gap emerges in Britain in the two elections under study. There is a slight advantage for the Conservatives among women but the difference is not statistically significant.

(Table 1 here)

**Gender Differences in Leadership Evaluations**

Based on the analysis in Table 1, the parties led by women, in most cases, did tend to do better among women voters. The presence of women as leaders may have attracted more women voters to their respective parties consistent with the gender identity hypothesis. We now turn to an examination of gender differences in leadership evaluations. In the following section we analyse gender differences in leadership evaluations and then develop a model of vote choice
that tests whether evaluations of women leaders are more influential among women voters. Table 2 presents average leadership evaluations by gender for each of the party leaders.\textsuperscript{4} Within each section of male and female party leaders, parties have been aligned from left to right. Leadership evaluations are measured using a 10-point ranking scale.\textsuperscript{5} Higher scores indicate more favorable evaluations. Negative gender gap numbers indicate women, on average, give a more favourable rating. As is evident from these results, the women party leaders, except in Britain, consistently produced significant gender gaps with women on average giving more favourable ratings. Even in Canada, where women tend to be more left leaning on issues (Chandler 1990), women gave more favourable evaluations of the Progressive Conservative leader Campbell. However, the largest gender gaps in leadership evaluations appear for McLaughlin and Clark who are both on the left of the ideological spectrum.

(Table 2 here)

In Australia, Kernot, gained more support among women. However, the two leaders on the right (Howard and Fischer) also gained significantly more favourable ratings among women reflecting previous research on the gender gap in Australia. Also in Britain where women tend to be more supportive of the Conservative party, a gender gap appears in evaluations of Labour Party leaders. In both 1979 and 1987, men tended to give significantly higher ratings to Callaghan (1979) and Kinnock (1987). In the two countries with left leaning gender gaps, New Zealand and Canada, women tended to rate male leaders on the right lower than men (in Table 2 see Manning in Canada and Bolger and Prebble in New Zealand) and male leaders on the left higher than men (see Anderton in New Zealand). These gender gap patterns in leadership
evaluations are consistent with previous findings on issue positions and partisan loyalties in these countries except for evaluations of Campbell. That Campbell had, on average, more favourable ratings from women suggests that the gender of the leader may influence evaluations and that the gender advantage in leadership evaluations does not apply exclusively to parties on the left. However, the other test cases of the gender effect on the right, Thatcher in 1979 and 1987, do not yield the same results. Women did not tend to give Thatcher higher ratings than men in either of the elections under study.

**Gender, Leadership and Vote Choice: Multivariate Analysis**

In order to further examine the role that gender identity plays in voting for parties with female leaders, we turn to a multivariate analysis of vote choice. Our main interest is whether or not the gender gap evident in Table 1 is sustained once other factors that may contribute to the gender gap such as education, occupation and party identification are held constant. We anticipate that the effect of gender identity will vary by electoral context. We expect to see greater gender effects in elections where the party leader is the focus of the campaign. As another aspect of gender identity, we also examine whether the gender differences in leadership evaluations affect the gender gap in voting. If women are more likely to give high evaluations to female party leaders, do they rely more heavily on these evaluations when deciding to vote?

Given the recent research on the interaction between gender and leadership evaluations by Hayes and McAllister (1997) we generally follow their model in order to make comparisons between the effects of leadership and gender on vote choice. The dependent variable is coded 1 if the respondent voted for the party identified in the table and 0 if the respondent voted for a different party. In Canada, Australia and Britain, we analyse the vote for the party candidate
standing in a single member district for the lower house. In New Zealand we analyze the party vote which is used to determine the partisan composition of parliament. For each party, we estimate one model with the main effects of gender and leadership evaluations and a second model that includes an interaction term between gender and evaluations. By comparing the two models, we can assess whether gender differences are mediated by leadership evaluations and whether women tend to rely on leadership evaluations of female leaders more so than men.

As control variables, we use a series of social and demographic characteristics (see Appendix B for coding). These are dichotomous variables that take on a value of 1 if the characteristic is present and 0 if it is not. For example, those who work in the public sector are given a score of 1 and 0 otherwise. Other occupation related variables are whether or not the respondent is in a manual occupation and is a member of a union. Because, employment status may confound the relationship between gender and vote choice, we have included a dichotomous variable indicating whether the respondent is working. Groups in each country that may display particular voting patterns have also been identified in the model: French speakers in Canada, immigrants in Australia, Maori in New Zealand and the working class in Britain. In all countries, except Britain, this group status variable identifies a minority group.

To control for the effects of partisan loyalties, we use a measure that distinguishes whether the respondent identifies with the party of the leader being analyzed. We also control for those without any partisan identification. Evaluations of the economy have also been included and represent the sum of evaluations regarding personal financial situation and national economic situation in general and due to government policy (see Appendix B for coding and question wording). Because religion has been found to be an intervening variable in the relationship between gender and vote choice (see Hayes and McAllister 1997), we have included
both a dummy variable signifying whether the respondent is Catholic and a variable indicating church attendance in all models except for Canada where church attendance is not available.

The models reported in Tables 3 and 4 include leadership evaluations and the interactive effect of gender and leadership evaluations. The first set of models for each party test the main effects of gender and leadership. Leadership evaluations significantly affect vote choice in all models. Contrary to expectations, leadership effects were no stronger in New Zealand which uses a party vote to determine party representation in parliament than in countries which use single member districts exclusively. Furthermore, leadership evaluations mediate the effects of gender in all but one case for women leaders. In New Zealand, both gender and leadership evaluations of Clark significantly and positively influence vote for Labour. Among male party leaders, gender and leadership evaluations affect vote choice for Labour in Britain (1987 only), the Reform Party in Canada and for all New Zealand parties except ACT. Women in New Zealand gave Anderton of the Alliance higher evaluations; yet, when these evaluations are held constant men were more likely to vote for the Alliance. In the 1987 British election the opposite occurs, men gave significantly higher rankings to Kinnock; however, when these evaluations are held constant women were more likely to vote for Labour. This gender gap in voting is notable given that when a gender gap has occurred in Britain it has tended to benefit the Conservative Party. Overall though, the gender gaps evident in Table 1 for women party leaders disappear when controlling for social and political factors as well as leadership evaluations. Given that women tend to evaluate women leaders and leaders on the left more favourably, the direct effects of voter gender are mediated largely by evaluations.

(Tables 3 and 4 here.)
An alternative explanation for the significant gender differences in votes for Labour and the Progressive Conservatives is that because these are major parties they gain greater media coverage and thus more voters could identify the leaders. Generally, greater visibility of women leaders would lead to the increased probability of gender identity. Either explanation rests on more women supporting the party or candidate of the party due to the gender of the leader.

Among the female leaders of smaller parties, there are no significant gender gaps when leadership evaluations are in the model. Among the smaller parties headed by men, several gender gaps were significant. Smaller parties at the center and on the right tend to do better among men. In New Zealand, ACT and New Zealand First were significantly more likely to attract votes from men. In Canada, the far right Reform Party had a significant advantage among men; women were three-fourths as likely to vote for the Reform party as men. That the gender gap is positive for the Progressive Conservatives and negative for the Reform Party, both parties on the right and center-right in Canada, suggests that Campbell may have had the effect of keeping women in the ranks of Conservative voters but that men defected to the Reform Party.

The second set of models for each country tests the interaction between gender and leadership effects. The interaction term tests whether the effect of gender is dependent on the level of leadership evaluation and whether the effect of leadership evaluation on vote choice is dependent on gender (Friedrich 1982). The interaction term, which is the product of the dummy variable for gender and leadership evaluation, has a value of zero when the voter is male and, therefore, applies only to female voters. The interaction term is significant in five of the models; it is significant in predicting vote for Howard’s Liberal Party, McLaughlin’s NDP, Campbell’s Progressive Conservatives, Thatcher’s Conservative Party in 1987 and Chretien’s Liberal Party. A positive interaction term indicates that the slope of the line for leadership effects is steeper for
women than men and a negative interaction term indicates the slope is less steep for women. The interaction term can also be interpreted in terms of the effects of gender on vote choice with a positive term indicating a greater effect of gender for different values of leadership evaluations.

Because the effects of the interaction term depends on the values of both gender and leadership evaluations, the relationships are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. The predicted probabilities of voting for the given parties is calculated by holding all variables except for gender and leadership constant at their mode (for dummy variables) or mean (for remaining variables). Figures 1 and 2 show the interactive effects on vote for the Progressive Conservatives, the NDP, the Liberal/National coalition in Australia, the Liberal Party in Canada and the Conservative Party in Britain’s 1987 election. Female party leaders are shown in Figure 1 while male party leaders are shown in Figure 2. The figures demonstrate that the degree to which gender differences play a role, in these cases, depends on the evaluation for the party leader (and, conversely, the effect of leadership evaluations depends on gender). For example, women who gave McLaughlin an evaluation of 10 were more likely to vote for the NDP than men who gave her the same ranking. However, women who gave her a rating of 0 were less likely to vote for the NDP than men who gave the same ranking. The figure for McLaughlin is similar to that for Campbell though the effect of gender and leadership evaluations combined is stronger for McLaughlin. In each case though, women are more likely to vote for the party’s of these women leader’s if they give them favourable ratings.

In the case of Thatcher and the 1987 vote for the Conservative party, the main effects of female are positive but not significant. However, the interaction between gender and leadership evaluations is significant and negative. This negative interaction term indicates that leadership evaluations have less of an effect on vote choice for women and that the effect of being female
decreases as leadership evaluations increase. As can be seen in Figure 1, the difference in probability of voting for the Conservative Party between the high end and the low end of the scale is less for women than it is for men. This model predicting Conservative vote is the only model in which a significant interaction term is negative. In the other models shown in Figures 1 and 2, the effect of leadership evaluations is greater for female and the effect of female increases as leadership evaluations increase.

In the case of Howard, women who gave a low ranking to Howard are less likely to vote for the Liberal/National coalition than men who gave a similar ranking, yet, because of the upper bound on the probability of voting for the coalition, women are no less likely to give them their vote than men at higher evaluations. In Canada, men are more likely to vote Liberal than women; however, the effect of evaluations of Chretien has a greater impact on Liberal vote for women than for men. As can be seen in Figure 2, the slope of the line showing the probability of voting Liberal is steeper for women than for men.

(Figures 1 and 2 here)

**Conclusion**

The group identity hypothesis regarding the gender gap in voting for female candidates tests whether or not women are more likely to vote for women candidates because they share a common group identity regardless of partisanship or other politically relevant factors. While this hypothesis has been tested in various ways for women candidates, it has never been tested in relationship to women as party leaders. Our analysis of gender identity based on party leaders yields two useful findings: 1) Gender is related to vote choice when the leader of the party is a woman even when controlling for partisan identification; and 2) the effects of gender are not mediated by leadership evaluations, in most cases, even though women tend to give women
leaders higher evaluations. That gender is significantly related to vote choice in parliamentary systems where the leader of the party is a woman suggests that gender identity can extend beyond local candidates to party leaders. However, these results do not suggest that gender of the party leader is the major reason for vote choice among men and women as other politically relevant variables are significant in the vote choice models.

While gender is a significant factor is some contests, the analysis also shows that leadership evaluations are important determinants of vote choice in parliamentary democracies. These leadership effects are substantial in both party list and SMD electoral systems. Even though women tend to evaluate women leaders more favourably, leadership evaluations do not appear to mediate the effects of gender. We find only limited evidence that leadership evaluations play a larger role for women voters in vote choice and this effect of leadership evaluations for women is not confined to parties headed by women. However, we find that in one case women tend to rely less heavily on leadership evaluations than men (Thatcher in Britain). Overall, the effect of leadership evaluations is fairly strong in all countries and for all parties even after controlling for partisan identification which suggests that characteristics of the leaders, such as gender, are important in an analysis of parliamentary elections.

Although we have no rigorous control for the context of the campaign, there is some evidence that the major parties in Canada and New Zealand seem to benefit from gender identity either because their women leaders were placed at the center of the campaign or because they gained greater media attention. Contrary to previous expectations about the gender gap, this gender effect applies to parties on the right and the left. The opportunity to further test whether the gender identity hypothesis applies across the ideological spectrum will arise as parties on the left and right elect more women leaders. In the 1999 parliamentary election in New Zealand,
both major parties were lead by women. The advent of more women leaders will also allow a
more rigorous test of the hypothesis that the context of the election determines when gender
effects emerge.

As a final observation based on these comparative data, like Studlar, McAllister and
Hayes (1998), we find no consistent gender effects across these four countries. Perhaps the most
consistent finding is that smaller parties on the center and far right such as ACT and New
Zealand First in New Zealand and the Reform Party in Canada are disadvantaged among women
voters. The trend toward a left leaning gender gap that has been noted in the U.S. and several
European countries appears not to be a general trend. The center right parties which have
traditionally (at least prior to the 1980s) enjoyed an advantage among women do not seem to be
losing female voters.
Appendix A
Appendix B

Question Wording and Coding

Manual Occupation
All Countries: Skilled/Unskilled Manual Occupations = 1; Otherwise = 0.

Working
All Countries: Paid Work Full Time = 1; Otherwise = 0.

Public Employee
All Countries: Work for Government (either Federal or Provincial/State in Australia and Canada), Work in Public Sector or Work for Government Enterprise = 1; Otherwise = 0.

Union Member
All Countries: Respondent is Member of Union = 1; Otherwise = 0.

Education
All Countries: University Degree = 1, Otherwise = 0; Secondary Degree = 1, Otherwise = 0.

Group Status:

Canada
French Speaker = 1; Otherwise = 0.

New Zealand
Maori = 1; Otherwise = 0.

Australia
Immigrant = 1; Otherwise = 0.

Britain
Working Class = 1; Otherwise = 0.

Age
All Countries: Age in 10’s of years (age in years/10).

Catholic
All Countries: Catholic = 1; Otherwise = 0.

Church Attendance
Australia: A five point scale ranging from 0 to 1 where 1 equals several times a week and 0 equals never.

Britain: A seven point scale ranging from 0 to 1 where 1 equals once or more a week and 0 equals never.

New Zealand: A five point scale ranging from 0 to 1 where 1 equals at least once a week and 0 equals never.
Gender
All countries: Female = 1; Male = 0.

Party Identification
All Countries: Identify with Party of the Leader in the Model = 1, Otherwise = 0; No Party Identification = 1, Otherwise = 0.

Economic Evaluation
For each country an index is created using the mean score from listed questions for each respondent.

Canada
a) Would you say that over the past year economic conditions in [name of province] have gotten better, stayed about the same or gotten worse? (better=1, stayed same = 0, worse = -1)
b) Have the policies of the federal government made the [name of province] economy better worse, or haven’t they made much difference either way? (better=1, stayed same = 0, worse = -1)
c) Would you say that over the past year Canada’s economy has gotten better, stayed about the same or gotten worse? (better=1, stayed same = 0, worse = -1)
d) Have the policies of the federal government made Canada’s economy better worse, or haven’t they made much difference either way? (better=1, stayed same = 0, worse = -1)

New Zealand
a) How does the financial situation of your household now compare with what it was 12 months ago? (a lot better=1, a little better = .5, about the same=0, a little worse=-.5, a lot worse = -1)
b) How do you think the general economic situation in the country now compares with a year ago?(a lot better=1, a little better = .5, about the same=0, a little worse=-.5, a lot worse = -1)
c) Compared with a year ago, would you say that the 1963-96 National government’s policies had a good effect, bad effect, or did they not make much difference to the financial situation of your household? (good effect = 1, not much difference = 0, a bad effect = -1).
d) What effect do you think they had on the general economic situation in the country as a whole? (good effect = 1, not much difference = 0, a bad effect = -1).

Australia
a) How does the financial situation of your household now compared with what it was 12 months ago? (a lot better=1, a little better = .5, about the same=0, a little worse=-.5, a lot worse = -1)
b) And how do you think the general economic situation in Australia now compares with what it was 12 months ago? (a lot better=1, a little better = .5, about the same=0, a little worse=-.5, a lot worse = -1)
c) Compared with 12 months ago, would you say that the Federal Labor government's policies have had a good effect, a bad effect, or that they really have not made much difference to the financial situation of your household? (good effect = 1, not much difference = 0, a bad effect = -1).
d) And what effect do you think they have had on the general economic situation in Australia as a whole? (good effect = 1, not much difference = 0, a bad effect = -1).

**Britain 1987**

a) Since June '83 general election increased/fallen prices? (-1 = Increased a lot, -.5 = Increased a little, 0 = Stayed the same, .5 = Fallen a little, 1= Fallen a lot).
b) Since June '83 general election increased/fallen unemployment? (-1 = Fallen a lot, -.5 = Fallen a little, 0 = Stayed the same, .5 = Increase a little, 1= Increase a lot).
c) Since June '83 general election increased/fallen taxes? (-1 = Increased a lot, -.5 = Increased a little, 0 = Stayed the same, .5 = Fallen a little, 1= Fallen a lot).

**Britain 1979**

Britain’s economy in last 6 months? (-1 = got worse, 0 = got better, 1 = got better).

**Party Leader Evaluation**

**Canada** (100 point scale collapsed to 10 points)

“I’ll ask you to rate each leader on a scale that runs from 0 to 100. Ratings between 0 and 50 mean that you rate that person unfavourably. Ratings between 50 and 100 mean that you rate the person favourably. You may use any number from 0 to 100.

**New Zealand**

Please rate each party leader on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you strongly dislike that party leader and 10 means that you strongly like that party leader.

**Australia**

Please rate each party leader on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you strongly dislike that party leader and 10 means that you strongly like that party leader. If you are neutral about a particular party leader or don't know much about them, you should give them a rating of 5.

**Britain 1979**

Mark out of 10 for party leader.

**Britain 1987**

10 point scale constructed for each leader from following questions:

a) Good/bad at getting things done (10 = good at getting things done, 5 = neither or both, 0 = bad at getting things done).
b) Extreme/moderate (10 = moderate, 5 = neither or both, 0 = extreme).
c) Looks after one/all classes (10 =looks after all classes, 5 = neither or both, 0 = looks after one class).
d) Not/capable of being strong (10 =capable of being strong, 5 = neither or both, 0 = not capable of being strong).
e) Caring/uncaring(10 =caring, 5 = neither or both, 0 = uncaring).
f) Likely to unite/divide nation (10 =unite nation, 5 = neither or both, 0 = divide nation).
g) Likeable as person(10 =Likeable, 5 = neither or both, 0 = not likeable).
References


Endnotes

1 In addition to the 1993 Canadian, 1996 New Zealand and Australian elections, we analyze both the 1979 and 1987 British elections. In 1979 Thatcher was a new party leader and is thus comparable to the other women leaders in the study who were also standing in their first elections as party leaders. In 1987, Thatcher was a longstanding incumbent prime minister. Comparing incumbent to first time party leaders broadens the analysis.

2 An alternative research design would involve examining a party’s support within a country in consecutive elections where the party is headed by a man and then a woman. However, this does not allow for comparison across countries and across parties of the left and right. Additionally, shifts in partisan support between elections may be due to election specific variables other than the gender of the leader that cannot be controlled for.

3 Studlar, McAllister and Hayes report that women were “more to the left than men at the three elections (1979, 1983, 1987) in which the Conservative party was led by Britain’s only female major party leader” (1998, 782). However, in the bivariate table we find no statistically significant or substantive differences in support for the Liberal (plus Social Democratic Party), Labour or Conservative parties in 1979 or 1987. Only after controlling for political and socio-demographic factors, do we find that women were significantly more likely to vote Labor in 1987 (see text).

4 Given that the Bloc Quebecois did not contest a significant number of ridings in the 1993 federal elections, we have excluded the Bloc Quebecois from the remaining analysis due to a small sample size.

5 The Canadian election study uses a feeling thermometer on a 0 to 100 scale. For ease of comparison to the 1996 New Zealand and Australian and the 1979 British Election Studies, we have re-scaled the Canadian feeling thermometers to range from 0 to 10. The 1987 British Election Study did not use a 10 point scale to evaluate party leaders. Instead, a 10 point scale is constructed from questions evaluating leadership traits. See appendix for question wording.

6 Because smaller parties are not likely to contest all seats, if a party did not stand a candidate in a respondent’s electorate, the respondent is coded as a missing case.

7 Multinomial logit is an alternative method of estimating a model with a nominal dependent variable with more than two categories but assumes that the each alternative represents and independent choice (“independence of irrelevant alternatives” or IIA). In the context of multiparty choice, Alvarez and Nagler (1998) argue that this assumption is unreasonable and recommend using multinomial probit to estimate voting models in multiparty systems. At present computing capabilities, this estimation technique is difficult to accomplish (see Alvarez and Nagler 1998, 83). For our purposes we feel separate binomial logit models comparing a single party to all other parties is more appropriate for determining the effects of gender and leadership evaluations on vote choice.

8 Although not reported in the paper due to space limitations, we did examine the main effect of gender (without controlling for leadership evaluations) on vote choice. Once social and political controls are added, only the gender gaps evident in Canada and New Zealand in Table 2 remain. Among the parties led by women, gender has a significant effect in three out of the six cases. Women were significantly more likely to vote for the Progressive Conservatives and the NDP in Canada and for Labour in New Zealand. Contrary to expectations based on an issue explanation of the gender gap, these differences appear in parties on the right and on the left lending some support to the gender identity hypothesis. Despite the presence of a woman leader, there are no significant gender differences in voting for the British Conservative Party or the Australian Democrats.
Table 1. Gender Differences in Vote Choice: Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Britain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Canada 1993</th>
<th>Australia 1996</th>
<th>New Zealand 1996</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Conservatives</td>
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<td>Reform Party</td>
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<td>16.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bloc Quebecois</td>
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Chi-square: 20.10 (df=4)**  
N: 1374 1244

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Britain 1979</th>
<th>Britain 1987</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservatives</td>
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<td>Labour</td>
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<td>SDP/LIB Alliance</td>
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Chi-square: 1.568 (df=2) **  
N: 340 392

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Chi-square: .017 (df=2)
N: 673 740

p < .05; ** p < .01

Source: 1993 Canadian Election Study (ICPSR 6571), 1996 Australian Election Study and 1996 New Zealand Election Study (Social Science Data Archive, Australia National University), 1979 and 1987 British Election Studies (University of Essex Data Archive).
### Table 2: Gender and Party Leadership Evaluations: Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Britain

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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>McLaughlin (New Democratic)</td>
<td>Campbell (Conservative)</td>
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<td>Canada 1993</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Gap</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
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*Difference of means test significant at $p < .05$.

Source: 1993 Canadian Election Study (ICPSR 6571), 1996 Australian Election Study and 1996 New Zealand Election Study (Social Science Data Archive, Australia National University), 1979 and 1987.
### Table 3. Gender, Leadership Evaluations and Vote Choice in Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and Britain: Female Party Leaders

(Maximum Likelihood Estimates)

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<td>Thatcher/Conservative Vote</td>
<td>Campbell/PC Vote</td>
<td>Mclaughlin/NDP Vote</td>
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Standard errors are in parenthesis
* p < .05 (one-tailed test)
** p < .025 (one-tailed test)

Source: 1993 Canadian Election Study (ICPSR 6571), 1996 Australian Election Study and 1996 New Zealand Election Study (Social Science Data Archive, Australia National University), 1979 and 1987 British Election Studies (University of Essex Data Archive).
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<th>New Zealand 1996</th>
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<td>Anderton/Alliance Vote</td>
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<td>Identify with Leader's Party</td>
<td>4.11 ** 4.11 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Party Identification</td>
<td>1.55 ** 1.55 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Evaluation</td>
<td>-1.13 ** -1.13 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Leader Evaluation</td>
<td>0.46 ** 0.44 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader * Female</td>
<td>0.04 (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Correctly Classified</td>
<td>92.26 92.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>1533 1533</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1: Interaction of Gender and Leadership on Vote (Female Leaders)

Note: Estimates derived from Table 3. Probabilities are for those identifying with the NDP (Canada) and Conservative (Britain). All other variables held constant at the means and modes.
Note: Estimates derived from Table 4. Probabilities are for those identifying with Liberal (Canada) and Liberal or National (Australia). All other variables held constant at the means and modes.
Appendix A: Party placements

New Zealand

Labour  National  NZFirst  ACT
Alliance

Australia

Labor  National  Liberal/National
Democrats

Canada

PCons  National  Liberal  Reform
NDP

Britain

Labour  National  Conservative
Liberal

Left  Center  Right

Source: Party placements for New Zealand and Australia are based on Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Macro-level Data (www.umich.edu/~nes/cses). Canadian party placements were provided by the Canadian Election Study. British placements are based on survey respondent rankings from the 1987 British Election Study.